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CASE COMMENTS
OMI HOLDINGS v. ROYAL INSURANCE: APPLYING
THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST TO
TERRITORY OF COVERAGE CLAUSES
I. INTRODUcInON
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Insur-
ance Co. of Canada' addressed whether a court can exercise personal
jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company when its only contact
with the forum is the forum's inclusion within a "territory of coverage
clause" in an insurance policy. A territory of coverage clause lists the
fora in which the insurance company agrees to defend claims against
the insured that fall within the scope of the insurance policy. Several
state and federal courts have addressed the issue of whether the mere
existence of a territory of coverage clause including the forum state
meets the "minimum contacts" standard that is necessary to exert per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, and the resulting de-
cisions vary tremendously-leaving a controversial and unsettled area
of the law.2 The OM court held that the existence of a territory of
coverage clause including the state of Kansas was enough to establish
minimum contacts, but personal jurisdiction was improper because it
would violate due process.3
A majority of courts reason that because the insurer entered into
a contractual obligation regarding the indemnification and defense of
the insured in that forum, it is not unreasonable to require the in-
surer to defend cases in the forum, even those that do not involve the
defense of the insured.4 Today, even though several United States
Supreme Court decisions have attempted to clarify the quantity and
quality of minimum contacts that are necessary to establish personal
1 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998).
2 See discussion infra Part IV.
3 See OM, 149 F.3d at 1095-96.
4 See infta notes 115-45 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction, 5 the level of contacts needed in a specific case is still hard
to gauge. Hence, courts struggle to apply the minimum contacts test
in cases involving territory of coverage clauses.
This Case Comment explores the issue of specific personal juris-
diction over a foreign defendant when the only minimum contact
with the forum is a territory of coverage clause that includes the fo-
rum state. Part II summarizes the evolution of the personal jurisdic-
tion test that has emerged out of the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.6 Part III presents the
OM! decision and its background. Part IV surveys various approaches
taken by courts in deciding whether the inclusion of a forum in a
territory of coverage clause is sufficient to establish minimum contacts
with the forum. Finally, Part V concludes that the OM[ case was cor-
rectly decided. The mere inclusion of the forum in a territory of cov-
erage clause is sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test, but
because the overall quantity of the contacts may be low, courts should
pay special attention to the reasonableness requirement of the per-
sonal jurisdiction test.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE MINIMUM CoNTAcrs TEST
Because plaintiffs have the opportunity to choose the forum in
which they file a lawsuit, the doctrine of personal jurisdiction has
emerged as a constitutional standard limiting the power of courts by
protecting "an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the
binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no mean-
ingful 'contacts, ties, or relations." 7 Many states have long-arm stat-
utes that govern instances when a nonresident party can be sued in a
forum within the state, but a court in such a state cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant if the exercise of personal jurisdiction
would violate the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.8
The Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe laid the foun-
dation for modern personal jurisdiction doctrine by establishing a
two-part test for determining whether the assertion of jurisdiction
5 See infra notes 7-27 and accompanying text.
6 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
8 The Due Process Clause provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. In
federal cases, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must satisfy the requirements of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, while the state courts are bound by the Four-
teenth Amendment.
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over a nonresident defendant meets constitutional standards. First,
the plaintiff must establish that the defendant has purposefully availed
itself to the forum by establishing such minimum contacts necessary
so that she should reasonably anticipate being required to appear
before a court in that forum.9 Second, the court must conclude that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is
reasonable and does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' 0 By establishing this minimum contacts thresh-
old, the Court has provided some protection to defendants so that
they are not required to appear before a court in a state with which
they do not have a substantial connection.
A. Establishing Minimum Contacts
Courts must analyze a defendant's contacts with a forum state to
determine whether general or specific jurisdiction is appropriate. A
plaintiff can establish that the court has general jurisdiction over a
defendant by showing that the defendant has had "continuous and
systematic general business contacts"" with the forum. Specific juris-
diction can be found if the plaintiff shows that the defendant purpose-
fully directed activities towards the forum and that the plaintiff's claim
arose out of those minimum contacts that connected the defendant
with the forum state.12
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'5 the Court described
the significance of the minimum contacts analysis:
The concept of minimum contacts ... can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coe-
qual sovereigns in a federal system. 14
Whether or not the defendant could foresee the litigation is crucial
because it must be established "that the defendant's conduct and con-
nection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably antic-
ipate being haled into court there."' 5 The minimum contacts test
9 See International Shoe; 326 U.S. at 320.
10 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
11 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
12 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.
13 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
14 Id. at 291-92.
15 Id. at 297.
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gives judges the power to exercise great discretion and leaves them as
the "supreme arbiters"16 of jurisdictional standards.
Because the concept of minimum contacts requires a case-specific
inquiry, courts have struggled to determine what level of contacts
should be sufficient to meet the test.17 In Travelers Health Association v.
Virginia,18 the Supreme Court concluded that exercising personal ju-
risdiction over a nonresident defendant who had solicited business by
mail was sufficient to establish minimum contacts because it "cre-
ate [d] continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of an-
other state."' 9 However, the Court emphasized the forum state's
interest in enforcing the insurance policy within its borders so that its
residents were not forced to "seek redress only in some distant state
where the insurer is incorporated." 20
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,2 1 the Supreme Court
sustained jurisdiction over a Texas-based insurance corporation in
California, concluding that the minimum contacts test was satisfied by
a single insurance contract. In McGee, the policyholder had
purchased a life insurance policy from the defendant while residing in
Arizona. After the policyholder moved to California, the defendant
issued a reinsurance policy and continued to accept premiums from
the insured until he died in California.22 As in Travelers, the Court
expressed concern that the California resident would be severely dis-
advantaged if he was forced to bring a lawsuit against the insurance
company in a distant state.23 The Court stressed that because an in-
surance policy was involved, the defendant should have reasonably
foreseen that a claim would arise in the forum.24 One year after its
decision in McGee, the Court stated that personal jurisdiction in McGee
16 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (Black, J., concur-
ring); see also id. at 319 ("[T] he criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which
do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.").
17 See, e.g., Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman?
Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVis L.
REV. 769, 773-74 (1995). Cameron andJohnson argue that the International Shoe per-
sonal jurisdiction test leads to increased litigation and "uncertainty [that] may result
in serious injustice, an irony in light of the fact that fairness is one of Shoe's touch-
stones." Id. (citation omitted).
18 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
19 Id. at 647.
20 Id. at 649 (citations omitted).
21 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
22 See id. at 221-22.
23 See id. at 222-24.
24 See id. at 224.
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was proper because the nonresident insurers were in a business "that
the State treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation. 25
McGee seemed to signal an expansion of the doctrine of mini-
mum contacts because technological progress had increased the inter-
action and flow of commerce between states.2 6 However, McGee left
open three questions: (1) whether minimum contacts would have ex-
isted if the defendant had not reissued an insurance policy when the
plaintiff was in California or had otherwise been unaware of the
move;27 (2) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would have
been reasonable if the state had not possessed such a strong regula-
tory interest in the matter; and (3) whether the Court meant to estab-
lish a lower standard for the minimum contacts test in cases involving
insurance policies.
B. Reasonableness Test
Even after a showing of minimum contacts, the court must make
a due process inquiry and determine that an exercise of personal juris-
diction over the defendant comports with "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."28 With cases involving foreign defend-
ants, courts must pay special attention to this part of the personal ju-
risdiction test, balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial against
the advantages the plaintiff has by litigating in the United States, such
as civil juries, a broad discovery system, fairly easy access to courts,
contingent fee arrangements, and the general policy against cost-shift-
25 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958); see also Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670 n.18 (1st Cir. 1980) (stating that when
the defendant is an insurance company, the minimum contacts test is "somewhat less
stringent than for other nonresident corporations"); RussellJ. Weintraub, A Map Out
of the Jurisdictional Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 531, 535 (1995) (noting the exten-
sive reach of the McGee holding).
26 See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. The Court noted that an expanding national econ-
omy, ability to conduct interstate commercial transactions, and improving technology
had made communication exceedingly easier in the twentieth century and that the
doctrine of personal jurisdiction should model the extension. See id at 222-23.
Recent developments in the Internet have forced courts to reexamine personal
jurisdiction in light of technological progress and to address the issue of whether a
court may assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant when her only contact with
the forum was through the use of the Internet. See Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Note, Casting
the Net: Another Confusing Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts in Telco
Communications v. An Apple a Day, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 505 (1998).
27 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. V. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (re-
jecting the assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the
plaintiffs unilaterally subjected the defendant's automobile to the foreign state).
28 Id at 292 (citation omitted) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
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ing rules.29 As with the minimum contacts element of the personal
jurisdiction test, the reasonableness test gives courts tremendous flexi-
bility to look at each case on a fact-specific basis. Because courts have
such discretion, it is difficult to predict whether a court will hold that
the assertion of personal jurisdiction is proper,30 especially in the case
of foreign defendants.31
1. Asahi Factors
Courts generally approach the reasonableness part of the mini-
mum contacts test by examining the facts of each case in light of five
factors listed by the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Supe-
rior Cout.32 (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's
interest in resolving the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in receiving
29 For a general discussion of the pros and cons of subjecting foreign defendants
to personal jurisdiction in a U.S. forum, see generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum
Shopping, Domestic and International 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 563 (1989) (arguing that it is
often hard to convince courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants).
30 The Sixth Circuit made the following statement about the "elasticity" of the
reasonableness component of the personal jurisdiction test:
[T] here is a downside, as well as an upside, to the judicially imposed require-
ment that each and every question of personal jurisdiction over a non-resi-
dent defendant be decided "on its own facts," with counsel and court sifting
through each new complex of facts in search of "contacts" demonstrating
that the plaintiff's choice of a forum does or does not accord with the no-
tions of "reasonableness" and "fair play" reflected in a vast number of fact-
specific judicial opinions. More sharply defined standards might well reduce
miscalculations on the part of lawyers who, not surprisingly, normally seek a
home court advantage if they think they see some chance of getting it-and
it is not inconceivable that clearer standards might lead to more expeditious
and efficient resolution of those jurisdictional questions that counsel choose
to fight out in court.
LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enter., 885 F.2d 1293, 1304 n.7 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted).
31 See Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Coveniens in
International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposalfor a Uniform Standard, 28 TEx.
INT'L LJ. 501, 504 (1993). Silberman observed:
Supreme Court decisions in the areas of both jurisdiction and forum
non coveniens have left lawyers and their clients with little guidance as to
when the United States will be a proper forum. Parties find it difficult to
plan and structure their business so as to avoid litigation in the United
States; lawyers take advantage of the various incentives for forum shopping
offered by the complicated interrelationships of federal and state law, and
the transaction costs of litigation on these access issues increase.
Id.
32 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's in-
terest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and
(5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.33
The Asahi litigation ensued after a motorcycle accident severely
injured a California resident and killed his wife.34 The plaintiff sued
several defendants, including Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co.
(Cheng Shin), the Taiwanese manufacturer who had made the tire
tube that allegedly caused the accident. 35 Cheng Shin filed an indem-
nification claim against several codefendants, including Asahi Metal
Industry Co. (Asahi), the Japanese manufacturer of the tire tube valve
assembly.3 6 Subsequently, the plaintiff settled with all of the defend-
ants and only Cheng Shin's claim against Asahi remained. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether a foreign
defendant, whose only contact with the state was the placement of its
goods into interstate commerce, had established sufficient minimum
contacts with that state to subject it to personal jurisdiction.3 7
Although a majority of the Court did not agree on whether the
placement of the goods into the stream of commerce constituted min-
imum contacts, a majority of the Court did conclude that "the heavy
burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff
and the forum State, [made] the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a
California court over Asahi in this instance[] . . . unreasonable and
unfair."38
In cases involving both foreign and domestic defendants, 39 courts
generally apply the Asahi factors only after concluding that sufficient
33 See id at 113.
34 See id. at 105-07.
35 See id at 106.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 105. The Court split 4-4 on the issue. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Powell, and Scalia concluded that Asahi's mere awareness that the goods would reach
California did not establish the requisite minimum contacts and that additional activ-
ity purposefully directed at the forum state was necessary. See id. at 112-13. Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun found in contrast that Asahi's regular and
extensive sales of component parts to manufacturers, whom they knew were selling
the product in California, met the threshold requirement of minimum contacts. See
id. at 116-21.
38 Id. at 116. But see RussellJ. Weintraub, Asahi Sends PersonalJurisdiction Down the
Tubes, 23 TEx. INT'L LJ. 55, 62-63 (1988) (criticizing Asahi's "reasonableness" ration-
ale for deciding that personal jurisdiction did not exist over the foreign defendant).
39 See Silberman, supra note 31, at 509 ("Asahi... cannot be read as intended for
application in international cases alone."); see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 126 (3d ed. 1996) (discuss-
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minimum contacts exist.40 In cases involving a domestic defendant,
most courts find that jurisdiction is reasonable. 41 However, in cases
involving foreign defendants, "[g] reat care and reserve should be ex-
ercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the
international field."42 Even after the plaintiff has established that the
foreign defendant had minimum contacts with the forum, it is not
unusual for courts to hold that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the foreign defendant would be unreasonable. 4 3
ing that even though Asahi involved a foreign defendant, courts generally apply the
same due process test in cases involving both domestic and foreign defendants).
40 See, e.g., Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 471 (1st Cir. 1990)
(finding that if the plaintiff fails to meet its burden of showing that the defendant had
minimum contacts with the forum, then a "resort to the secondary criteria . . . is
unnecessary").
41 See Silberman, supra note 31, at 510.
42 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
43 See, e.g., St. Jarre v. Heidelberger Druckmaschinen, No. 93-1848, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5604 (4th Cir. March 25, 1994) (per curiam) (holding that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a German manufacturer was unreasonable when a third
party had intervened in a foreign sales market and brought the German product into
the forum); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., 11 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
that foreign doctors had established minimum contacts with the forum by publishing
allegedly false and defamatory articles about the plaintiffs product in a professional
journal that was distributed world-wide, but holding thatjurisdiction over the foreign
individuals would be unreasonable); Lichon v. Aceto Chem. Co., 538 N.E.2d 613 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (holding that minimum contacts existed where an English manufac-
turer shipped hazardous chemicals into the United States, but finding that personal
jurisdiction would be unreasonable and detrimental to foreign relations). But see, e.g.,
Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that the exercise
ofjurisdiction over a Dutch drug manufacturer who marketed its product in the U.S.
through the use of American distributors was reasonable, since there were sufficient
contacts with the forum state); Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., 985 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the French defendant
Renault was reasonable when the defendant had established minimum contacts by
authorizing nationwide advertising and marketing efforts that included the forum
state of Georgia where the plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries as a result of a defect in
the defendant's product); Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th
Cir. 1989) (granting personal jurisdiction over a Yugoslavian supplier of asbestos who
had sold asbestos to a freight forwarder for shipment to Texas); Mason v. F. LLI Luigi
& Franco Dal Maschio Fu, 832 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that an Italian manu-
facturer who frequently shipped products to Maryland was subject to personal juris-
diction in Illinois because the defendant knew the product frequently made its way to
Illinois).
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III. OMlff oHzbzGs v. RoYAz INsuAvc.E
A. Background
Between 1985 and 1992, OMI Holdings, Inc. (OMI) manufac-
tured and sold large-granule wheat starch (LGS) used by paper mills
in the making of carbonless copy paper.44 OMI was a subsidiary of the
Canadian Corporation ofJohn Labatt, Ltd. (Labatt) and was incorpo-
rated in Iowa, maintaining its principal place of business in Minne-
sota.45  Manildra Milling Corporation (Manildra), OMI's chief
competitor in the LGS market, was incorporated in Kansas and filed
suit against OMI in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas on November 6, 1986 (Manildra lawsuit). Manildra sought a
declaration that OMI's patents for producing and processing LGS for
use in carbonless paper were invalid,46 and even if the patents were
valid, Manildra had not infringed OMI's patents.47 Manildra also al-
leged that OMI had violated federal antitrust laws, the Lanham Act,48
and state laws forbidding unfair competition and tortious interference
with another company's prospective business.49
Before the Manildra lawsuit went to trial in 1991,50 OMI con-
ducted extensive discovery and held numerous settlement discus-
sions.51 OMI retained new trial counsel on November 5, 1990, who
asked whether OMI's insurers had been notified of the pending law-
suit and if any of OMI's insurance policies covered the legal costs of
the defense in the Manildra lawsuit.52 Even though OMI's parent
company, Labatt, had an in-house risk management department that
reviewed OMI's claims for potential insurance coverage and had the
44 See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1089 (10th
Cir. 1998).
45 See id.
46 The patents in dispute were U.S. Patent Nos. 3,901,725 (covering the process
for making LGS) and 4,280,718 (covering carbonless paper made using LGS). See
OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of Canada, No. 95-2519-KHV, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22341, at *5 (D. Kan. January 7, 1997), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. OMI
Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998).
47 See Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 874, 878-79 (D.
Kan. 1992), aFfd in relevant part, Nos. 92-1462, 92-1480, 1993 WL 217173 (Fed. Cir.
June 22, 1993).
48 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
49 See Manildra, 797 F.Supp. at 878-79.
50 The Manildra lawsuit was first tried on March 4, 1991, but juror misconduct
led to a mistrial on March 28, 1991. The second trial commenced on August 26, 1991
and ended on February 26, 1992. See OMT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22341, at *28 n.9.
51 See OM, 149 F.3d at 1089.
52 See id.
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responsibility of notifying insurance companies of claims under each
policy,53 OMI did not notify Royal Insurance Company of Canada
(Royal) and Seaboard Surety Company of Canada (Seaboard) about
the potential claims until nearly four years after the commencement
of the Manildra lawsuit.54 The insurance companies denied that
Labatt's policies covered the claims underlying the Manildra lawsuit.55
In the alternative, they argued that because OMI had violated the no-
tice provisions in the contracts, 56 coverage was not required even if
the claims were covered under the insurance policies.57
The Manildra lawsuit went to trial in 1991, and at its conclusion
the district court upheld the jury's verdict, which awarded Manildra
$2,250,000 in compensatory damages and $2,500,000 in punitive dam-
ages, and granted Manildra's motion for attorney's fees.5 8 OMI then
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
against five Canadian insurance companies seeking indemnification
for costs, attorney fees, and postjudgment interest incurred 59 in de-
fending the Manildra lawsuit. 60 Royal and Seaboard-both Canadian
insurance companies that were not registered to transact business in
Kansas-moved to have OMI's complaint dismissed for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. 6 1 OMI argued that personal jurisdiction over the
53 See OW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22341, at *7-8.
54 See id.
55 See OM, 149 F.3d at 1090.
56 Defendant Royal's policy contained a provision requiring OMI to provide no-
tice of any potential claims and the claim's particulars "as soon as practicable." OM!,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22341, at *10. Defendant Seaboard's policy required that the
insured provide notice of a potential claim "as soon as practicable" and file copies of
any papers "with reasonable promptness." Id. at *15.
57 See OMI, 149 F.3d at 1090.
58 See Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 874, 887-88 (D.
Kan. 1992), affd in relevant part, Nos. 92-1462, 92-1480, 1993 WL 217173 (Fed. Cir.
June 22, 1993).
59 OMI contended that it accrued costs of over seven million dollars defending
the Manildra lawsuit. See Appellee's Opening Brief at 1, OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal
Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998) (Nos. 97-3022, 97-3041, 97-3042)
(copy on file with author).
60 OMI notified five insurers of possible coverage: Royal, Seaboard, Chubb Insur-
ance Company of Canada (Chubb), Royal Indemnity Company (Royal Indemnity),
and Zurich Insurance Company of Canada (Zurich). Chubb, Royal Indemnity, and
Zurich settled with OMI after the court ruled on the cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. Therefore, this Case Comment addresses only the issues between OMI, Royal,
and Seaboard. See Appellee's Opening Brief, OM! (Nos. 97-3022, 97-3041, 97-3042) at
1; OM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22341.
61 See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of Canada, No. 95-2519-KHV, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21999 (D. Kan. November 22, 1996), rev'd sub nom. OMI Holdings,
Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998).
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insurance companies had been established for two reasons: (1) it had
included Kansas in the territory of coverage clauses; and (2) it had
contracted to defend OMI in Kansas for claims within the insurance
policies.6 2
The district court held that OMI had "produced sufficient evi-
dence to establish the existence of possible liability under the con-
tracts in question, and that through such contractual relationships,
minimum contacts with the State of Kansas may be attributed to the
defendants such that their appearance here does not offend due pro-
cess."6 3 On cross-motions for summary judgment, Royal and Seaboard
asserted that their respective insurance policies did not provide cover-
age for OMI based on the allegations in the Manildra lawsuit, and that
even if the policies did provide coverage, they were under no duty to
indemnify OMI due to its late notice of the pending lawsuit.64 The
district court granted the summary judgment motion in favor of Royal
and Seaboard, holding that, although it was possible that the insur-
ance policies covered the allegations underlying the Manildra lawsuit,
OMI's four-year delay in notifying the insurance companies violated
the notice provisions in the policies, and the insurers did not have a
duty to defend OMI.65
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
OMI appealed the district court's determination that Royal and
Seaboard were prejudiced by OMI's late notice and argued that the
issue was one of material fact, which the district court had improperly
62 See id at *7-8. Royal's insurance policy provided coverage for personal injury
liability that covered libel, slander, and defamation claims. See OMT, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22341, at *8-9. Seaboard's insurance policy provided advertising liability pro-
tection and obligated the company to defend Labatt and its subsidiaries from claims
arising from libel, slander, defamation, copyright infringement, invasion of privacy,
and unfair competition. See id. at *12-14. In the Manildra lawsuit, Manildra alleged,
among other things, that OMI had made "false and unjustified statements to Manil-
dra's potential customers." Id. at *8. OMI alleged that statements such as these were
the foundation of many of Manildra's claims and that Royal and Surety's policies
therefore covered the lawsuit. See id at *8.
63 OMT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21999, at *13. The district court also denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer under forum non conveniens. See id. at
*15-16.
64 See OMI, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22341, at *18-24.
65 See id. at *23. The district court determined that OMI's late notice constituted
a breach of the insurance policies' notice provisions and prejudiced Royal and Sea-
board and that OMI'sjustification that "it did not occur to OMI or Labatt to consider
whether coverage was available" was inadequate. Id. at *28.
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decided on summary judgment.66 Royal and Seaboard cross-ap-
pealed, arguing that the district court erroneously denied their mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. However, they asked
the court not to address the personal jurisdiction issue unless it con-
cluded that OMI's late notification of the Manildra lawsuit obligated
them to indemnify OMI.67 The court concluded that it needed to
consider the insurers' cross-appeal regarding personal jurisdiction
before reaching the merits of OMI's appeal "[b] ecause a court with-
out jurisdiction over the parties cannot render a valid judgment."68
1. Applying the Minimum Contacts Test
In OM, there was no dispute that the territory of coverage
clauses contained in the policies between OMI, Royal, and Seaboard
included the state of Kansas. 69 According to the terms of the territory
of coverage clauses, the defendants were required to hire an attorney
to defend OMI in Kansas for claims arising under the policies so long
as OMI complied with the notice provisions in the policies. However,
the crucial issue the OMI court faced was whether the existence of the
territory of coverage clauses established sufficient minimum contacts
to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant Canadian insur-
ance companies when OMI sued Royal and Seaboard for breaching
the conditions in the insurance contracts. 70
Kansas, like most states, has a statutory provision establishing per-
sonal jurisdiction over insurers who include the state in their territory
of coverage clauses and thereby agree to defend the insured in that
forum.7 1 After taking into account the applicable statute, the OMJ
court still faced the task of determining whether the exercise of per-
66 See OMI, 149 F.3d at 1090.
67 See id.
68 Id. (citing Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 879 (10th Cir. 1982)).
69 Seaboard had issued Labatt an advertiser's liability policy extending coverage
to "legal proceedings brought in ... the Courts of any of the states of the United
States." OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of Canada, No. 95-2519-KHV, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21999, at *9-10 (D. Kan. November 22, 1996), rev'd sub nom. OMI Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998). Royal had issued a
comprehensive general liability policy to Labatt agreeing to defend "on behalf of the
Insured [OMI] any claim or civil suit against the Insured .... [to] pay all costs taxed
against the Insured in any legal proceeding .... [and] to pay interest accruing after
entry ofjudgment." Id. at *10.
70 OMI sued the defendants for indemnification for the costs of defending the
Manildra lawsuit. The OMI court recognized that "a number of State courts and sev-
eral of our sister circuits" had addressed the same issue and that the resulting deci-
sions were "difficult to reconcile." OMI, 149 F.3d at 1092.
71 The applicable statute states in part:
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sonal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants met the constitutional
standards of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. OMI
conceded that Royal and Seaboard did not have the contacts neces-
sary to establish generaljurisdiction. 72 The OMJ court concluded that
Royal and Seaboard had established the requisite minimum contacts
necessary to satisfy specific jurisdiction by including Kansas within the
scope of the territory of coverage clauses. 73 In coming to this determi-
nation, the OM[ court surveyed several appellate cases addressing the
territory of coverage clause issue.74
2. Applying the Reasonableness Test
The OM court concluded that the existence of the territory of
coverage clause in Royal and Seaboard's policies was enough to estab-
lish minimum contacts with Kansas; however, the court warned that
the contacts were "qualitatively low on the due process scale." 75
Although courts have struggled with deciding the precise relationship
between the two parts of the personal jurisdiction test,76 the OM
court followed the majority in viewing the relationship as a "sliding
scale" in which the quantity of the defendant's contacts determines
the amount of weight given the second part of the personal jurisdic-
tion test-the due process or reasonableness inquiry.77 The OM
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in
person or through an agent or instrumentality does any of the acts hereinaf-
ter enumerated, thereby submits the person and, if an individual, the indi-
vidual's personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state
as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of these acts:
(1) Transaction of any business within this state;
(4) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting;
(9) serving as the insurer of any person at the time of any act by the
person which is the subject of an action in a court of competentjurisdiction
within the State of Kansas which results in judgment being taken against the
person.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b) (1), (4), (9) (1994).
72 See OM 149 F.3d at 1091 (citing Appellant's Reply Brief at 35, OM! (Nos. 97-
3022, 97-3041, 97-3042) (copy on file with author)).
73 See id. at 1095.
74 See infra Part IV.B.
75 OM1, 149 F.3d at 1095.
76 See generally Silberman, supra note 31, at 505-13.
77 See OM1, 149 F.3d at 1091-92 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see also LindaJ. Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Supe-
rior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules ofJurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22
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court favorably noted the First Circuit's approach describing the rela-
tionship between the two parts of the personal jurisdiction test:
We think ... that the reasonableness prong of the due process in-
quiry evokes a sliding scale: the weaker the plaintiff's showing on
[minimum contacts], the less a defendant need show in terms of
unreasonableness to defeatjurisdiction. The reverse is equally true:
an especially strong showing of unreasonableness may serve to for-
tify a borderline showing of [minimum contacts].78
In deciding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be
unreasonable, the OIJ court applied the Asahi factors.79 Because the
Asahi factors were critical in influencing the OMT court's decision that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Royal and Seaboard would
be unreasonable, it is important to look at each factor separately.
a. Burden on Defendant to Litigate in the Forum
As noted in Asahi, "[lt] he unique burdens placed upon one who
must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant
weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of
personal jurisdiction over national borders."80 The burden on the de-
fendant "is of primary concern in determining the reasonableness of
personal jurisdiction"81 and "great care and reserve should be exer-
cised"8 2 before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a for-
eign defendant.
In OM, there was a significant burden on the defendant insur-
ance companies to litigate the dispute in Kansas. Royal and Seaboard
did not have agents or offices in Kansas, did not insure any Kansas
residents, and did not have licenses to conduct business in Kansas.83
The insurance policies in dispute were issued in Canada by Canadian
RUTGERS L.J. 569, 576-83 (1991) (arguing that the present reasonableness test for
personal jurisdiction is unworkable).
78 OM, 149 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Ticketmaster-NewYork, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d
201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994)).
79 See supra text accompanying note 33.
80 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (quoting
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
81 OM, 149 F.3d at 1096 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980)); see also id. at 1096 n.3 (quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981) ("If the burdens of trial are
too great for a plaintiff, the plaintiff can decide not to sue, or, perhaps, to sue else-
where. A defendant has no such luxury.")).
82 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
83 See OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096.
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insurance companies and were governed by Canadian law.84 Addi-
tionally, Royal and Seaboard would need to travel to a distant forum
in order to litigate a matter covered by the law of their own country,
which would constitute a substantial burden.85 After examining the
facts in' the OMI case, the court concluded that this factor heavily fa-
vored the defendants.8 6
b. Forum State's Interest in Adjudicating the Dispute
Courts generally evaluate the forum state's interest in the under-
lying lawsuit by examining whether it has a need to protect the inter-
est of one of its own citizens or an interest in the interpretation and
application of its law.87 The factor weighs heavily for the resident
plaintiff when she has suffered an injury in the forum state as a result
of the nonresident's contacts with the forum 88-especially in the case
of defective products89 -and when she seeks to enforce a contractual
obligation.90
OMI argued that the state of Kansas had a significant interest in
resolving the dispute within its borders because the Manildra lawsuit
originated there, and the indemnification claim included fees ac-
crued by Kansas attorneys.91 The OMT court rejected the argument
84 See id.
85 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. For some examples of when courts have concluded
that although the burden on the defendant to litigate in the foreign forum might be
great, it is likely the burden on the plaintiff to litigate overseas or in a foreign country
is equally as great, see Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir.
1988), Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, 707 F.2d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 1983), and
Karsten Manufacturing Corp. v. United States Golf Association, 728 F. Supp. 1429, 1435 (D.Ariz. 1990).
86 See OM1, 149 F.3d at 1096.
87 See, e.g., Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1988);
American Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1170 (6th Cir. 1988).
88 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1985) (noting that
the forum state had a manifest interest 'in providing its citizens with a convenient
forum when they had been injured by a nonresident in that state).
89 See, e.g., Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990); Morris v. SSE,
Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 495 (11th Cir. 1988); Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d
660, 668 (7th Cir. 1986).
90 Compare Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 701 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that a breach of contract action involving a forum resident gave the state a significant
interest in the dispute), with Pacific Ad. Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d
1325, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that when the contract was neither negotiated
nor performed in the forum, then the forum state's interest in the litigation taking
place in that state was minimal).
91 See OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096-97 ("The record contains no evidence showing that
the attorneys have lost or are in danger of losing their fees.").
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and concluded that the state's interest in the litigation was minimal
because the parties involved were not Kansas residents, they were not
licensed to conduct business there, and there had not been a tortious
act committed in the state. 92
c. Plaintiffs Interest in Convenient and Effective Relief
When the plaintiff has a much greater chance of recovery in the
chosen forum because of that forum's laws9 3 or when the plaintiff
would be at a severe disadvantage if she must bring suit against a cor-
porate defendant in a forum where she is not a resident,9 4 this factor
heavily favors the plaintiff. When the parties are both corporate enti-
ties who are not residents of the forum and have minimal interest in
that forum, this factor does not weigh very heavily for the plaintiff.9 5
In such instances, the plaintiff must convince the court that litigating
the issue in another forum is not a viable option.96
OMI, an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in
Minnesota, did not conduct business in Kansas and had very few con-
tacts with the state.97 OMI failed to give the court an adequate ration-
ale for the need to litigate the dispute in Kansas rather than Canada-
where the policies, governed by Canadian law, were negotiated and
issued. Additionally, OMI's parent company, Labatt, maintained its
risk management office in Canada, and the employees involved in the
procurement and renewal of the policies were also located in Can-
ada.98 Of the ninety-four witnesses listed as having relevant testimony
to the dispute, forty-five were from Canada and only seven were from
92 See id. at 1096.
93 See id. at 1097 (citing Pacific Atlantic, 758 F.2d at 1331).
94 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
95 See, e.g., Gates Learjet Corp. V. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984).
96 Compare Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 387 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the physical and financial burdens on a Washington resident would be
great if forced to pursue the lawsuit in Florida), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), and Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield, 800
F.2d 1474, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986) (deciding that the costs of requiring the resident to
litigate outside of his home forum would be significant), with FDIC v. British-Ameri-
can Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir. 1987) (deciding that the burden on the
plaintiffs of litigating is small when they are involved in litigation in the foreign forum
as to a different dispute).
97 See OMI, 149 F.3d at 1097.
98 See Appellee's Reply Brief at 21, OMI (Nos. 97-3022, 97-3041, 97-3042) (copy
on file with author).
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Kansas.99 For these reasons, the OMT court concluded that the
"[p]laintiff may receive convenient relief in an alternative forum."10 0
d. Interstate Judicial System's Interest in Obtaining Efficient
Resolution
Factors that courts use in determining whether the forum in
question is the most efficient place to litigate the dispute include the
following: the location of witnesses;' 0 ' the location of the underlying
dispute;1° 2 the substantive law governing the case; 1 3 and whether de-
nying personal jurisdiction in that forum would require the dispute to
be litigated in several forums.10 4
The OM court concluded that it was inefficient to litigate the
matter in Kansas, a forum with which both parties had little contact,
rather than Canada, where the insurance policies in dispute were ne-
gotiated, drafted, and executed, and the law of which governed the
dispute.'0 5
99 See OMI, 149 F.3d at 1097.
100 Id Courts often find that as the distance increases between where the wit-
nesses reside and the forum where the court is located, it becomes more difficult to
secure witnesses' voluntary testimony. Compare Pacific Ad. Trading Co. v. M/V Main
Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that requiring the defendant to
litigate the lawsuit in a California forum when most of the witnesses were Malaysian
constituted a considerable burden), with Home v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255,
260 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that the burden on the defendant is minimal when the
witnesses are not from a particular locality).
101 See OMT, 149 F.3d at 1097 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco
Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 574 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328,
334 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is rea-
sonable in the forum where all the witnesses live).
102 See OM1, 149 F.3d at 1097 (citing Carteret Savings Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d
141, 148 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Pacific Atlantic 758 F.2d at 1331 (holding that the
forum is unreasonable when the underlying claim arose in Malaysia).
103 See OM1, 149 F.3d at 1097 (citing FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d
1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, 707
F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The court most competent to interpret the applicable
law should normally try the case.") (citation omitted).
104 See OMT, 149 F.3d at 1097 (citing Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abra-
sive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 1988)). The Delong court noted that in
"litigation involving numerous defendants from diverse geographic locations, it would
be onerous and cumbersome to require the plaintiff to proceed separately against
each defendant in the defendant's home forum, particularly given the strong federal
interest in allowing for efficient conduct of a complex lawsuit." Delong, 840 F.2d at
850-51.
105 See OM, 149 F.3d at 1097.
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e. Shared Interest of Several States in Furthering
Fundamental Substantive Social Policies
The Supreme Court noted in Asahi that the importance of the
fifth factor hinges on the degree to which the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant will affect both substantive social
policy interests within the United States and the "Federal interest in
Government's foreign relations policies."10 6 However, the mere exist-
ence of a conflict with the foreign nation's sovereignty will "not [be]
dispositive because, if given controlling weight, it would always pre-
vent suit[s] against a foreign national in a United States court."10 7 Sig-
nificant factors courts consider when evaluating this fifth factor are as
follows: (1) whether any of the defendants are citizens of a foreign
nation; 10 8 (2) whether a foreign nation's law governs the dispute;10 9
and (3) whether a foreign defendant made a conscious decision to
conduct business with the resident of the forum. 10
In OMI, the court concluded that this factor weighed heavily in
the defendants' favor and that exercising personal jurisdiction over
Royal and Seaboard in Kansas would seriously conflict with Canada's
interest in resolving and interpreting disputes regarding contacts ne-
gotiated and entered into in Canada."'
3. The OMI Court's Decision
After analyzing the five Asahi factors, the OMI court concluded
that exercising personal jurisdiction over the Canadian defendants
would violate the notions of fairness implicated by the Due Process
Clause and held:
Examining the above factors in their entirety, we conclude that to
subject Defendants to the rigors of litigating in Kansas, which has
no genuine interest in the dispute and with which Defendants have
only tenuous contacts, would be unreasonable and inconsistent with
the notions of "fair play and substantial justice" which form the bed-
rock of our due process inquiry. 12
106 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
107 OMI, 149 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325,
1333 (9th Cir. 1984)).
108 See id. at 1098 (citing FDIC, 828 F.2d at 1444).
109 See id.
110 See id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); Grand
Entertainment Group v. Star Media Sales, 988 F.2d 476, 484 (3d Cir. 1993)).
111 See id. (citing Paccar Int'l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, 757 F.2d 1058,
1065 (9th Cir. 1985)).
112 Id.
1328 [V€OL. 74:4
TERRITORY OF COVERAGE CLAUSES
The court emphasized that Royal and Seaboard were both Canadian
corporations that negotiated the insurance policies with OMI in Can-
ada and that the dispute would be governed by Canadian law.113 Ad-
ditionally, the defendants did not have licenses to conduct business in
Kansas, did not have offices or agents in Kansas, and had not agreed
to insure any Kansas residents." 4
IV. TERRITORY OF COVERAGE CLAUSES AND THE MINIMUM
CONTACrS TEST
A. Background
Insurance policies generally contain territory of coverage clauses
which state the geographical range of fora in which the insurer agrees
to defend the insured when disputes covered by the policy arise. A
territory of coverage clause generally contains "broad" language in
which the insurance company agrees to defend the insured in any fo-
rum in the United States or even worldwide. Insurance companies
often have numerous contacts with the fora, such as agents and of-
fices, but sometimes the insurance company, especially in the case of a
foreign company, does not have any contacts with the state other than
the fact that the state is included in a territory of coverage clause.
Disputes between the insured and the insurer about whether the
claim falls within the coverage of the insurance policy are common.
In these cases, the insured often files a lawsuit against the insurer so
that the court can determine whether there is a duty to defend or if
indemnification is appropriate for any matters already litigated or set-
tied. If the insurance company's only contact with the forum is the
forum's inclusion within the territory of coverage clause, the insur-
ance company often moves to dismiss the case for a lack of personal
jurisdiction, arguing that it lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum.
The majority of courts facing the issue of whether the minimum
contacts threshold has been met, based exclusively on the inclusion of
the forum in a territory of coverage clause, have concluded that suffi-
cient minimum contacts do exist because the insurer could foresee
being required to appear in court in that forum." 5 Recently, courts
have placed great reliance on the fact that territory of coverage dis-
113 See id. at 1096.
114 See id.
115 See generally William C. Hoffman, PersonalJurisdiction over Alien Insurance Compa-
nies: The Ten-itor,-of-Coverage Rule, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 703, 712-16 (1991) (observing
that most courts infer the necessary minimum contacts from policy language defining
the territory of coverage).
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putes involve an insurance contract in which the insurance company
had the opportunity to specify which fora were included in the pol-
icy-therefore eliminating unreasonably expensive or burdensome
fora.116
B. Facing the Territory of Coverage Clause Issue
1. Automobile Insurance Policies
Most cases addressing the question of exercising personal juris-
diction over an insurance company whose only contact with the forum
is a territory of coverage clause involve automobile insurance policies.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Portage La
Prairie Mutual Insurance Co.117 involved a car accident in Montana.
The driver responsible for the accident had insurance with Farmers
Insurance (Farmers), a California company, but was driving a car
owned by Canadian residents and insured by the Canadian insurer
Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Company (Portage).118 Portage
refused coverage under the policy and Farmers settled the claim.119
Farmers then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana against Portage, seeking declaratory relief and
damages because Portage had refused to reimburse Farmers for its
share under the car owner's policy.12 0 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction,
finding that Portage had established minimum contacts with Montana
because the insurance policy contained a territory of coverage clause
including Montana. 21 The court elaborated on its minimum contacts
analysis, determining that Portage had purposefully connected itself
with the forum state by entering into a contractual obligation that in-
116 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reason-
ing that insurance companies will estimate the potential liability risks of defending
the insured in a certain forum and adjust the policy premiums to reflect that risk).
117 907 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1990).
118 See id. at 912.
119 See id.
120 See id
121 See id. at 915. The Farmers decision has been cited by many courts as persuasive
authority for a similar finding of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile
insurer when the insurer has included the state in a territory of coverage clause. See,
e.g., Payne v. Motorists' Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1993); Szalay v.
Handcock, 819 S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Ark. 1991). But cf. Coughenour v. State Auto
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 94-55008, 1995 WL 470821, at *3-4 (9th Cir. Aug. 9,
1995) (denying personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in a forum listed in
the territory of coverage clause because the insured event did not occur in the
forum).
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cluded the duty to indemnify and defend its insured for accidents that
could possibly occur in Montana.122 The Farmers court, like the
Supreme Court in McGee, emphasized that the case involved an insur-
ance contract and stated:
Unlike the automobile sellers in World-Wide Volkswagen, automobile
liability insurers contract to indemnify and defend the insured for
claims that will foreseeably result in litigation in foreign states.
Thus litigation requiring the presence of the insurer is not only
foreseeable, but it was purposefully contracted for by the insurer.
Moreover, unlike a product seller or distributor, an insurer has the
contractual ability to control the territory into which its "product"-
the indemnification and defense of claims-will travel. 123
The court in Farmers relied heavily on the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Rossman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' 24 which
held that personal jurisdiction over an Illinois automobile insurer ex-
isted solely on the basis of the issuance of a territory of coverage
clause that included the forum.' 25 The Rossman court stressed the
fact that automobiles are inherently mobile and that the defendant
should have foreseen the possibility of a lawsuit in that forum.126 This
analysis seems to place an overemphasis on the foreseeability factor
given the Supreme Court's warning in World-Wide Volkswagen that a
defendant's ability to foresee a lawsuit in that forum is not itself suffi-
cient to establish the minimum contacts necessary for a valid exercise
of personal jurisdiction. 127
The OMcourt cautioned against focusing on what the defendant
did not do-exclude the forum from the territory of coverage
clause-instead of focusing on the defendant's positive, affirmative ac-
tions that created a connection with the forum state. 128 The OMI
court criticized Farmers and Rossman because "the insurers received no
premiums from the forum state and neither insurer attempted to
reach into the forum state to renegotiate the insurance agree-
ment." 29 These factors distinguish this line of cases from the
122 See Farmers, 907 F.2d at 913-14.
123 Id. at 914 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
124 832 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1987).
125 See id. at 286-87.
126 See id.
127 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
128 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). The Supreme
Court stated that a defendant had not purposefully availed herself to the forum state
on the basis of "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity
of another party or a third person." Id. (citations omitted).
129 OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir.
1998).
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Supreme Court's decision in McGee. The McGee court found that a
single insurance contract with a resident in the forum was enough to
establish minimum contacts, but also relied heavily on the fact that
the insurance company had reissued the policy and received premi-
ums from the policyholder when he resided in the state. 30
The Tenth Circuit addressed an automobile coverage case in
Rambo v. American Southern Insurance C., 13 1 in which an insurance
company issued car insurance to an Alabama resident. Initially, the
policy covered a truck located in Alabama. The insured then moved
to Oklahoma without notifying the company and filed a claim. The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the insured's unilateral act of moving to
Oklahoma-a state which was included in the territory of coverage
clause of the insurance policy-was not enough to satisfy the mini-
mum contacts standard to require the insurance company (having no
other contacts with Oklahoma) to appear in court in Oklahoma.132
Most courts, however, follow the line of reasoning found in Farm-
ers and Rossman and conclude that the inclusion of a forum in a terri-
tory of coverage clause satisfies the threshold of minimum contacts
needed to establish personal jurisdiction. While the automobile cases
are instructive in examining the issue found in OM1, they differ in
that, normally, the forum involved is the state where the accident took
place, giving the state a significant interest in the dispute being de-
cided in that forum-a factor that weighs heavily towards the plaintiff
when applying the reasonableness part of the personal jurisdiction
test.
2. General Liability Insurance Policies
General liability insurance policies, like those at issue in OM,
also include territory of coverage clauses. In Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara
130 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221-22 (1957).
131 839 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1988).
132 See id. at 1418; accord Huntv. Erie Ins. Group, 728 F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir.
1984) (finding that personal jurisdiction would be improper when the defendant's
only contact with the forum state was its inclusion in a territory of coverage clause and
the plaintiff had failed to produce additional evidence showing that the defendant
had purposefully availed herself to the forum state); Batton v. Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., 736 P.2d 2, 6-8 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that foreseeability of insured
being injured in any state in the U.S. is insufficient to establish the requisite minimum
contacts needed for a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction). For more examples of
automobile liability insurance cases where the court concluded that the inclusion of
the forum in a territory of coverage clause was not alone enough to satisfy personal
jurisdiction, see Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Harris, 833 S.W.2d 850, 852
(Ky. Ct. App. 1992), Meyer v. Auto Club Insurance Ass'n, 492 So. 2d 1314, 1316 (Fla.
1986), and Hall v. Scott, 416 So. 2d 223, 230 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
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Fire Insurance Co., 133 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld jurisdic-
don over a Canadian insurance company based on the inclusion of
Minnesota in a territory of coverage clause. Domtar, a Canadian cor-
poration, owned a tar processing plant on the St. Louis River in Du-
luth, Minnesota until 1955.134 The Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (MPCA) investigated the site and determined that the ground-
water had become contaminated due to the release of hazardous
substances.' 3 5
Domtar sought a judgment in a Minnesota court declaring that
the Canadian General Insurance Company (Canadian General) had a
duty to defend Domtar against the MPCA under general liability in-
surance policies Canadian General had issued Domtar. Canadian
General moved to dismiss Domtar's claims, arguing that a Minnesota
court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it. 136 The Domtar
court concluded that Minnesota could assert specific jurisdiction over
Canadian General based on its issuance of the general liability policies
to Domtar and its inclusion within the scope of the territory of cover-
age clauses. In reaching this conclusion, the court also relied on the
fact that Canadian General knew that Domtar operated a site in Min-
nesota.' 37 The court held "that a court may assert specific personal
jurisdiction over anonresident insurer when (1) the insurer knows of
its insured's contact with the forum; (2) the risk insured against tran-
spires in the forum state; and (3) the forum state is not excluded from
the geographic coverage of the insurance policy.' 38 Although the
court concluded that the nonresident insurer had purposely directed
its activities toward the forum to sufficiently establish personal juris-
diction, 139 the court did question the soundness of holding that the
mere presence of a territory of coverage clause could establish suffi-
cient minimum contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Ca-
133 533 N.W.2d. 25 (Minn. 1995).
134 See id. at 28.
135 See id
136 See id. at 28-29.
137 See id. at 31-35; accord Armada Supply, Inc. v. Wright, 858 F.2d 842 (2nd Cir.
1988); Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1980). But see Travelers Indem. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 833 (5th
Cir. 1986) (holding that a foreign insurance company that issued insurance on vessels
that sometimes entered the forum's waters did not constitute minimum contacts and
that the plaintiff had not offered "evidence that any [contacts of the London com-
pany] were either based in Louisiana or [that the foreign defendant] engaged in
[activities] other than strictly international commerce"), modified on other grounds, 836
F.2d 850 (1988).
138 Domtar, 533 N.W.2d at 31.
139 See id. at 32-33.
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nadian defendant if the accident underlying the lawsuit had not
occurred in Minnesota.1 40
Recently, courts reaching the territory of coverage issue in per-
sonal jurisdiction contexts have begun to rely heavily on the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Insurance Co. 14 1 There, the
court upheld the district court's decision to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident insurance carrier which had issued an insur-
ance policy with a territory of coverage clause including the forum
state. The court concluded that due to the insurer's agreement to
defend the insured in that forum, it was reasonable to foresee the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in that forum. 142 The court reasoned
that by including a territory of coverage clause in an insurance policy,
the insurer had already calculated the risk involved with each forum
and should have excluded troublesome fora; thus in some sense it had
"waived" its right to assert a personal jurisdiction argument. 143 The
court emphasized this reasoning:
Insurers must carefully gauge the riskiness of the products they in-
sure .... The broader the distribution the greater the risk-and
presumably the higher the premium. Thus insurers cannot be said
to have failed to avail themselves, in a conscious and deliberate
manner, of the benefits of doing business in those fora in which the
insured manufacturer distributes its products. Moreover, an insurer
has a commercial interest in knowing how, and to what degree, an
insured manufacturer has contacts with a forum state.' 4 4
The Lilly decision can be interpreted as providing an economic ra-
tionale supporting the finding of minimum contacts in cases where a
defendant's only contact with the forum is its inclusion in a territory
of coverage clause.' 45
140 See id. at 31 n.4 ("It is difficult to understand how a court could conclude that
specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant exists when the forum is not the
situs of the injury, because in such a case, the plaintiffs claim would not arise from or
relate to the defendant's forum contacts.").
141 794 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
142 See id. at 720-21; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474
(1985) ("[T]he Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield
to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.").
143 See Eli Lilly, 794 F.2d at 721.
144 Id.
145 See Hoffman, supra note 115, at 713 ("[If] an insurer has not excluded the
forum state from the territory of coverage, the Lilly decision eliminates entirely the
need to search any further than the four corners of the policy for evidence to support
a finding of 'purposeful availment.'"). For examples of courts applying the economic
approach to personal jurisdiction as seen in Eli Lilly, see Southeastern Express Systems v.
Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. of Georgia, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 221-22 (1995) and
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The OMI court criticized Lilly because the decision placed so
much emphasis on the ability of the defendant to foresee being re-
quired to appear in court in a, forum when "foreseeability alone is an
insufficient basis on which to establish minimum contacts." 146 Addi-
tionally, the OMT court cautioned that relying only on the fact that the
defendant did not exclude the forum from its territory of coverage
clause in the policy focuses on inaction of the defendant instead of its
positive actions that purposefully availed it to the forum state. 47
In OMT, the court concluded, with little explanation as to its rea-
soning, that by "contracting to defend the insured in the forum state,
the insurer creates some contact with the forum state."'1 48 The court
qualified its conclusion by stating that, while the inclusion of the fo-
rum within the territory of coverage clauses was sufficient to establish
minimum contacts, the contacts were "qualitatively low' 49 on the due
process scale. The court, therefore, put greater emphasis on the sec-
ond part of the personal jurisdiction test-the reasonableness ele-
ment-using the Asahi factors.150
V. CONCLUSION
The OM court came to the correct conclusion in holding that
the inclusion of a forum within a territory of coverage clause estab-
lishes sufficient minimum contacts for the proper exercise of personal
jurisdiction. The OM decision is consistent with both the Supreme
Court's holding that one contact, in the form of an insurance con-
tract, can be sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test' 5 ' and the
majority of courts which take a Lilly-type approach to territory of cov-
erage clauses, viewing an insurance policy as the final product of ne-
gotiations between the insured and the insurer where fora in which
the insured did not wish to appear should have been eliminated. 52
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223,
232 (Tex. 1991).
146 OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1095 (10th Cir.
1998) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)).
147 See id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109
(1987)).
148 Id
149 Id.
150 See supra notes 79-114 and accompanying text.
151 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
152 See Hoffman, supra note 115, at 716-17. Hoffman stresses the need for insur-
ance companies to consider the consequences of establishing the requisite minimum
contacts with a forum so that the court has the power to exercise personal jurisdiction
over them, such as the power of the court to enter a defaultjudgment if the defend-
ant fails to reply to a properly served complaint, and the likelihood that the defend-
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After determining that sufficient minimum contacts existed, the
O! court properly put more weight on the reasonableness part of
the personal jurisdiction test. Several of the Asahi factors hinge on
the degree of interest the forum state has in the dispute, and Farmers,
Rossman, Domtar, and Lilly all dealt with situations where some type of
accident or damage occurred in the forum state and involved resi-
dents of the forum state; therefore, the forum state had a substantial
interest in the lawsuit being litigated within its borders. In contrast,
the OMI court faced a case where Kansas' interest in the lawsuit was
minimal and where the contract in dispute involved the interpretation
and application of Canadian law. The OM! court correctly held that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Canadian defendants
would be unreasonable and violate the Due Process Clause found in
the Fourteenth Amendment.
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